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Abstract The paper focuses on an interesting form of (person) indexical shift in
the Dravidian language Tamil which surfaces as 1SG agreement marking in a clause
embedded under a speech predicate. I show that this agreement is an instance of
indexical shift and label it “monstrous agreement”. However, I demonstrate that
its full range of empirical properties cannot be adequately explained by the major
analyses of indexical shift in the literature. The bulk of these, I argue, in addition
to being predominantly semantic in spirit, and thus ill-equipped to deal with a
morphosyntactic phenomenon like agreement, also involve two core misconceptions
regarding indexicality vs. logophoricity on the one hand and speech vs. attitude
predicates on the other. I propose that these core assumptions be strongly re-
evaluated from first principles and that syntactic and typological clues on the subject
be paid more heed. I propose a new analysis of the Tamil paradigms which derives
indexical shift within an enriched grammatical model involving contextual features
instantiated in a structurally articulated cartographic left periphery.
Keywords: Monsters, indexicals, anaphors, Tamil, contextual and φ -features, Agree(ment),
cartography, propositional complements.
1 The phenomenon: monstrous agreement
Consider the structure in (1) from the Dravidian language Tamil below:
(1) Ramani
Raman[NOM.SG]
[CP taan{i,∗ j}
SE[NOM.SG]
jey-pp-een-nnu]
win-FUT-1SG-COMP
so-nn-aan.
say-PST-3MSG
“Ramani said [CP that he{i,∗ j} would win].”
(1) contains a matrix speech predicate sonnaan (told.3MSG) which embeds a
finite clausal complement. The subject of this embedded sentential complement is
∗ I am very grateful to Gillian Ramchand for extensive discussions and feedback on this topic. Many
thanks are also due to Thomas McFadden and Peter Svenonius for invaluable comments and brain-
storming and to the audiences of the SALT 21 conference in Rutgers for feedback. I am indebted
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taan1 which is treated in the literature as a long-distance (i.e. SE-) anaphor that takes
animate 3SG antecedents (Annamalai 1999). In (1), taan is obligatorily coreferent
with the matrix (3rd person) subject Raman and is interpreted obligatorily de se.
The really curious property of (1) is the 1SG agreement marking on the embedded
verb jeyppeen. Tamil is a subject-agreement language: as such, verbal agreement
in Tamil typically reflects the φ -features of its clausemate subject. But in (1) the
clausemate subject for the embedded T head is taan whose own φ -features, given
its referential anaphoricity, may, indeed, be entirely absent (Kratzer 2009; Reuland
2011). So where does the 1SG agreement marking on the embedded verb come
from? To make matters even more complicated, this 1SG agreement marking on the
embedded verb (as well as taan itself) refer(s) not to the utterance speaker but to the
matrix 3MSG subject Raman which denotes the speaker of the matrix speech event.
This is the central puzzle.
1.1 Against a default agreement analysis
One plausible response to the agreement facts in (1) might be to claim that the 1SG
agreement on the embedded verb actually exemplifies default agreement. However,
default agreement in Tamil typically obtains in constructions involving experiencer
subjects with dative case and is invariably marked 3NSG.2 Also, the 1SG agreement
in (1) isn’t a frozen morphological form: it faithfully reflects the number feature of
the matrix subject – see (2) below:
(2) PasaN-gaíi
boy[NOM.PL]
[CP taan-gaí{i,∗ j}
SE[NOM.PL{i,∗ j}]
jey-pp-oom-unnu]
win-FUT-1PL-COMP
so-nn-aan-gaí.
say-PST-3MPL
“The boysi said [CP that they{i,∗ j} would win].”
Thus, a default agreement analysis doesn’t seem viable for the embedded agreement
marking in (1).
1 Crucially, taan does indeed seem to be an embedded subject in such stuctures and not, for instance, a
focus adjunct reflexive on the matrix subject DP. Emphasis of the form “Raman himself ...” in Tamil
is created by means of a focus clitic -ee which attaches to the focussed DP.
2 This is shown in (i) below:
i. Raman-ukku
Raman-DAT.SG
koovam
anger[NOM.SG]
va-nd-adu.
come-PST-3NSG
“Raman became angry.”
Lit. “Anger came to Raman.”
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1.2 Against a quotative analysis of 1SG agreement
Quotations may emulate shifted-indexicality effects because they “form a closed
domain with respect to syntactic and semantic operators” (Anand 2006: 81). This
grammatical opacity property of quotatives itself yields some useful diagnostics for
testing the existence of quotatives:3 for instance, an NPI inside a quotative may not
be licensed by an operator outside the quote.
However (3), which involves the licensing of an embedded NPI by a matrix NEG
operator, is fully grammatical showing that the embedded CP is not a full clausal
quotative:4
(3) Ramani
Raman[NOM.SG]
[CP taan{i,∗ j}
SE[NOM.SG]
oru
one
tapp=um
mistake=even
se-nj-een-nnu]
make-PST-1SG-COMP
ottukka-le.
admit-NEG
“Ramani didn’t admit [CP that he{i,∗ j} made any mistake].”
Finally, we can also rule out a partial quotative analysis for the structure in (1).
A partially quoted string should be possible under any type of predicate. Thus, if the
embedded CP in (1) did involve a partial quotative, we wouldn’t expect the kind of
systematic syntactico-semantic restriction of the phenomenon to the complements
of propositional speech predicates.
1.3 Not a Dravidian quirk: crosslinguistic support for monstrous agreement
1SG agreement such as that in Tamil (1) cannot be dismissed as a Dravidian quirk
either. Culy (1994); Curnow (2002) present data from Donna SO, a Niger-Congo
3 In English, quoted elements may never be embedded under a complementizer, so the concomitant
presence/absence of an overt complementizer can be used to tease quotatives and non-quotatives
apart. But languages like Tamil and Japanese embed quotatives and non-quotatives alike under the
same complementizer – thus, different diagnostics are needed.
4 For the sake of completeness, I present the minimal pair to (3) in (i) below – the embedded subject
taan is replaced with the 1SG naan (I); this sentence is ungrammatical. (ii) shows that when the NEG
operator locally binds the NPI, the sentence becomes fully acceptable:
i. * Ramani
Raman[NOM.SG]
[CP naan{utt−speaker,∗i}
I[NOM.SG]
oru
one
tapp=um
mistake=even
se-nj-een-nnu]
make-PST-1SG-COMP
ottukka-le.
admit-NEG
“*Ramani didn’t admit [“Ii made any mistake.”]”
“Ramani didn’t admit that Iutt−speaker made any mistake”
ii. Ramani
Raman
[CP naani
I
oru
one
tapp=um
mistake=even
seyya-le-nnu]
make-NEG-COMP
so-nn-aan.
admit-PST-3MSG
“Raman said “I didn’t make any mistake”.”
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language, which has a structure that resembles that in Tamil (1) to a startling degree.
The relevant paradigm is reproduced below:
(4) Oumari
Oumar
[CP inyemE{i,∗ j}
SE[SUBJ]
jEmbO
sack.DF
paza
drop
bolum]
left.1SG
miñ
1SG.OBJ
tagi.
informed
“Oumari told me [CP that he{i,∗ j} had left without the sack.]”
Curnow further argues that the embedded complement in such sentences does not
constitute a direct speech report and states that such 1SG agreement, while quite
rare, is evidenced in half a dozen other African languages. Further research must
be undertaken to ascertain the full range of empirical properties evidenced by
such structures – but I take the existence of sentences like (4) as evidence that
such agreement is not unique to Tamil or to the Dravidian languages. It is indeed
possible that further research on this topic will uncover other languages with similar
monstrous agreement structures.5
Now that we have seen what types of phenomena the structure in (1) does not
represent, we can move on to the types of phenomena that it does represent. Below,
I articulate two wellformedness conditions that appear to be necessary for the 1SG
agreement seen on the embedded verb in (1).
1.4 Prerequisite 1: embedding under a propositional speech predicate
The first prerequisite for the “mismatched” 1SG agreement in (1) to obtain is that
the superordinate verb be a speech predicate.6 Thus, in (5) below, where the em-
bedded CP is selected by a direct perception and attitude predicate, respectively, the
agreement marking on the embedded verb straightforwardly reflects the φ -features
of the matrix subject:
(5) Seethai
Seetha[NOM.SG]
[CP taan{i,∗ j}
SE[NOM.SG]
jey-pp-aaí-nnu]
win-FUT-3FSG-COMP
nene-tt-aaí.
nene-PST-FSG
“Seethai thought [CP that she{i,∗ j} would win.]”
Equivalent patterns obtain under other propositional verbs such as epistemic SEE,
factive KNOW, counter-factive PRETEND, and emotive FEAR. Speech predicates
5 A plausible reason for the typological rareness of monstrous agreement phenomena might be traced
to the uncommonness of anaphors in agreement-triggering position (Rizzi 1990; Woolford 1999). As
I will argue later, the presence of such an anaphor is a necessary condition for monstrous agreement.
6 The grammaticality judgments provided here correspond to my own native dialect of Tamil. An
online survey that I’ve conducted among various speakers, however, suggests that, for some dialects,
monstrous agreement can obtain under the scope of propositional attitude predicates like nene
(THINK) in (5) as well. However, it is clear that speech predicates are special even for such dialects,
in the sense that: if monstrous agreement obtains under an attitude predicate, it invariably also obtains
under a speech predicate.
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such as that in (1) are, thus, special in that they are capable of triggering this special
1SG agreement on the embedded verb in their scope.7
1.5 Prerequisite 2: the clausemate embedded subject is anaphoric
The second prerequisite is that the clausemate embedded subject be an anaphor. If
the clausemate subject is any kind of non-anaphoric element, the agreement in that
clause straightforwardly reflects the φ -features of this subject – this is illustrated
below:
(6) Seetha
Seetha[NOM.SG]
[CP
[
ni:N-gaí
you[NOM.PL]i
jey-tt-i:Ngaí-unnu]
win-PST-2PL-COMP]
so-nn-aaí.
say-PST-3FSG
“Seetha said [CP that youpl won].”
The 3rd person antecedence restriction of ta(a)n, noted earlier, in turn places the
corollary restriction that the peculiar 1SG embedded agreement in structures like (1)
only obtains when the superordinate subject is 3rd-person.
1.6 Enter indexical shift: 1SG agreement in (1) = “monstrous agreement”
In English, indexicals like I, here and now are always interpreted relative to the
context of utterance. Thus, once the context of utterance is known, the denotations
of these terms are fixed – an intuition that Kaplan (1989) captured by claiming
that indexicals refer “directly” and that their denotation cannot be manipulated by
intensional operators. Under Kaplan’s model, I, here and now have the “rigid”
semantic denotations given below:
JIKc,i = λcλ i.Author(c)JnowKc,i = λcλ i.Time(c)JhereKc,i = λcλ i.Location(c)
However, typological evidence from hitherto less-studied languages, like Amharic
(Schlenker 2003) and Indo-Iranian Zazaki (Anand & Nevins 2004), suggests that
the denotations of indexicals in these and other languages can be manipulated by
intensional operators. The Zazaki example from Anand & Nevins (2004) serves to
illustrate this point:
(7) HEsen-i j
Hesen-OBL
(m1k-ra)
I-OBL.TO
va
said
[CP kE
that
Ez j/k
I
dEwletia].
rich.be.PRES
7 Manner variants of SAY such as kattu (SCREAM), muïumuïu (MUMBLE), monagu (GROAN), and
polambu (MOAN) as well as arivi (ANNOUNCE) appear to take clausal complements with 1SG verbal
agreement.
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“Hesen said (to me) [CP that {I am, Hesen is} rich.]”
In (7), the indexical pronoun Ez (I) can refer to the speaker of the utterance context,
just like in English; but it can crucially also refer to the speaker of the saying event
denoted by the matrix verb, namely HEsen. Indexicals like Ez, which are capable
of altering their reference under certain intensional predicates, are called “shifted
indexicals” or “monsters” (the Kaplanian moniker for such elements).
Returning to the Tamil data, the fact that 1SG embedded agreement as in (1)
obtains under the scope of propositional speech predicates immediately suggests that
it is an instantiation of indexical shift. First, indexical shift has also been reported to
obtain predominantly under the scope of speech predicates (Anand 2006; Schlenker
2003; von Stechow 2002; Speas 1999; Shklovsky & Sudo To Appear). Second, the
agreement in (1), just like the indexical in (7), is 1st-person, and refers to the speaker
of the matrix speech context rather than to the speaker of the utterance context. I
will thus take it as uncontroversial that the 1SG agreement in Tamil (1) involves
an instantiation of indexical shift and will henceforth refer to it as “monstrous
agreement”.
At the same time, there is an important difference between the more “standard”
cases of indexical shift, as in Zazaki (7) above, and Tamil monstrous agreement.
The indexical shift in Zazaki involves a full-on DP whereas the Tamil case involves
agreement marking on a functional head. This is a non-trivial distinction: agreement
marking, unlike the φ -features on a DP, is not intrinsic to the category that hosts
it but must be inherited, via some sort of feature-transmission or feature-copying
mechanism like Agree (Chomsky 2001). Structures like (1) thus raise some addi-
tional questions. For instance, where is the 1st-person marking on the embedded
predicate inherited from? What is the syntactico-semantic contribution of the matrix
say-predicate, and what is the syntactico-semantic contribution of the clausemate
anaphoric DP taan in effecting this agreement?
In the following sections, I discuss three major recent analyses of indexical shift:
the context-overwriting analysis of Anand (2006), the pronoun-centric analysis of
Schlenker (2003), and the LF feature-deletion and quantificational binding analysis
of von Stechow (2002). In the process, I show that none of these analyses can
satisfactorily account for the full range of empirical properties seen in (1) because
they are not syntactic enough to deal with a primarily morphosyntactic phenomenon
like agreement and because they involve some core misconceptions about the relative
status of anaphors and indexicals and of speech vs. intensional predicates.
2 Analysis of indexical shift in Anand (2006)
Anand (2006) proposes that the difference between the shifted and unshifted read-
ings above is not the denotation of the indexical I, which remains constant (at
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λc.Author(c)), but the value of the context that the AUTHOR function ranges over.
In Anand’s acccount, shifted indexicality is the result of context shifting due to
context-overwriting by an operator introduced by an intensional predicate. Anand
proposes that the type of context-overwriting operator is parametrized: in some lan-
guages, the operator overwrites every contextual coordinate in its scope whereas in
others, only a proper subset of contextual coordinates is overwritten. This correctly
yields the typological differences in shiftable indexicals observed crosslinguistically.
In Zazaki, all types of indexicals may be shifted. Thus, the Zazaki operator functions
as follows:
JOP∀αKc,i = JαK j,i where j = <Auth(i),Addr(i),Time(i),World(i)>.
The shifted reading in (7) is thus derived as follows:8
[Hesen said [CP OP∀ I am rich]]c,i,g = [Hesen said [CP I am rich]]i
′,i′,g
= 1 iff, [Hesen said [CP AUTHOR(i’) am rich]]i
′,i′,g
= [Hesen said [CP Ihesen am rich]]i
′,i′,g
2.1 Anand’s analysis of Dravidian taan
Can Anand’s context-overwriting analysis for shifted indexicals be exploited to
shed light on the monstrous agreement phenomenon in Tamil? Interestingly, Anand
discusses the anaphoric pronoun taan in Malayalam, a closely related Dravidian
language, and claims that taan is not an anaphor but a shifted indexical based on
two diagnostics. First, he shows that Malayalam taan receives an obligatory de se
interpretation with respect to its antecedent. This interpretive property, for Anand,
means that taan is one of two sorts of elements with dedicated de se LFs: an anaphor
or an indexical. Anand then applies a diagnostic, termed the De Re Blocking Effect,
to distinguish between these two possibilities for taan. The De Re Blocking Effect
is a well-formedness condition on the interaction between de se anaphors and de re
elements in the syntax which states that a(n obligatorily) de se anaphor may not be
c-commanded by a de re element.9 Thus, anaphors are expected to be sensitive to
the De Re Blocking Effect whereas indexicals are not. In the Malayalam sentence in
(8) below (Anand 2006: 155) (formatting mine), the embedded DP tannai which is
8 Unshifted Reading A: [Hesen said [CP Isandhya am rich.]] (UNSHIFTED)
There is no context overwriting; the indexical I is interpreted against the utterance context (perhaps
introduced at root C) and is thus mapped onto the utterance speaker = me, Sandhya (in this utterance
context).
9 The interested reader is referred to Chapter 1, Section 1.4 of Anand (2006) for detailed argumentation
and motivation of this generalization.
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de se is c-commanded by the de re element awanooã@ in direct violation of the De
Re Blocking Effect, but the resulting sentence is grammatical:
(8) [[Mary
Mary[NOM.SG]
tan-nai{i, j}
SE-ACC.SG
sneehikkuïïu
loves
eïï@]
COMP
Bill j
Bill
awan-ooã@i
him-to
paraññu
said
eïï@]
COMP
Johni
Johni
wicaariccu.
thought
“Johni thought [that Bill j told himi [that Mary loves him{i, j}]]”
Based on this, Anand proposes that taan is not an anaphor but an (obligatorily
shifted) indexical and attempts to derive its properties via his context-overwriting
approach. Unfortunately, there are some non-trivial problems with this, as I discuss
below. These issues are compounded for Tamil which differs from Malayalam in
one very important respect. Malayalam, unlike Tamil, lacks all (verbal) agreement
marking and thus exhibits no morphological agreement differences such as those we
have seen for Tamil.10
2.2 Problem I: Antecedent-restriction to 3rd person DPs
The first major problem for a context-overwriting approach is that Tamil as well as
Malayalam taan only take 3rd person antecedents (9). However, such a restriction
is entirely unexpected if, as Anand claims, these elements really are 1st-person
indexicals underlyingly:
(9) * Naan/Nii
I[NOM.SG]/You[NOM.SG]
[CP taan
SE[NOM.SG]
poo-r-een-nnu]
go-PRES-1SG-COMP
sol-r-een/sol-r-aai
say-PRES-1SG/say-PRES-2SG
“I say, ‘I will go.”’
“You say, ‘I will go.”’ (Intended)
Under Anand (2006)’s context-overwriting approach, this antecedence restriction
would have to be captured by claiming that a speech predicate like SAY in Tamil (and
Malayalam) may introduce a context-shifting operator only if it is itself specified as
3rd person. But such a condition, while workable, is, as Anand himself concedes,
very stipulative and perhaps even unexpected: why, after all, should the (putatively)
semantic context-overwriting operator be sensitive to the morphosyntactic features
of the predicate that introduces it?
10 The other major Dravidian languages are Telugu and Kannada, both of which do have overt agreement
marking, and I am informed (by Rahul Balusu, p.c.) that Telugu exhibits monstrous agreement in
structures analogous to that in Tamil (1).
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2.3 Problem II: The 3rd-person agreement paradigm in Tamil (5)
The second major problem under a context-overwriting approach is how to account
for 3rd-person embedded verbal agreement as in (5). Interestingly, this is a prob-
lem that Anand (2006) doesn’t deal with for Malayalam because it has no verbal
agreement, as noted above. If we were to extend Anand’s analysis to the Tamil
data, we would, essentially, be forced to derive these differences as a function of
featural distinctions on taan in (5) vs. (1) – such as, for instance, by stipulating (in
the absence of any independent evidence) that taan is an anaphor in the former but
an indexical in the latter. This is clearly also not an attractive result.
2.4 Problem III: naan vs. taan
Tamil has a purely “English-like” 1SG indexical naan:
(10) Raman
Raman
[CP naan
I
jey-pp-een-nnu]
win-FUT-1SG-COMP
so-nn-aan.
say-PST-3MSG
“Raman said [CP that Iutt−speaker will win].” (Indirect speech)
“Raman said, ‘I will win’.” (Quotative/Direct speech)
If indexical shift obtains due to context-overwriting at LF, as Anand proposes,
and taan and naan are both indexicals, it is unclear how the morphophonological
distinction between the two is to be captured. The problem, it should be noted, is
not insurmountable: one could, for instance, propose that a 1SG indexical that is
introduced by a context-overwriting operator is spelled out as taan whereas one that
is not is spelled out as naan. However, the formulation of such rules requires an
articulated feature structure for indexicals and contextual operators in the syntax,
which is lacking in Anand’s analysis.
3 Problems with the pronoun-centric model (Schlenker 2003)
Schlenker (2003) attempts to derive indexical shift as a function of the syntactico-
semantic properties of the indexicals themselves. Simply put, some indexical pro-
nouns, like those in English, are inherently specified as being unshifting with respect
to the utterance context; others, like those in Amharic and Zazaki, are underspecified
as to whether they can shift; still others, such as logophors in e.g. Gokana (Hyman &
Comrie 1981) and other languages, are semantically specified to always shift relative
to the utterance context. The formal denotations of these indexicals are, thus, as
follows:11
11 c* is a free variable that refers to the context of utterance c; δ represents the presuppositions
introduced by the features; and a pro-form is represented as a free variable whose reference is
constrained by semantic presuppositions (Heim & Kratzer 1998).
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JIEngKc,g = Jxi +Author ∗ (xi)Kc,g = s(xi) ∧ δ (g(xi) is Author(c))JIAmhKc,g = Jxi +Author(xi,c j)Kc,g = s(xi) ∧ δ (g(xi) is Author(c j))JILogKc,g = Jxi +Author(xi,c j)Kc,g = s(xi) ∧ c j 6= c*: δ (g(xi) is Author(c j))
Since much of the action is localized to the denotations of the indexicals them-
selves, Schlenker’s model would be able to capture the distinction between unshifting
naan (10) and shifting taan in Tamil (1) and (5). Specifically, naan would have
the denotation of an English-like “I” whereas taan would have the denotation of a
logophoric “I” – as formalized above. I take this to be an advantage of Schlenker’s
system over Anand’s. Nevertheless, the other two problems mentioned for Anand
remain an issue for Schlenker as well. That is, it is unclear how to derive the distinc-
tion between monstrous agreement in (1) and 3rd-person agreement in (5) given that
both are presumably triggered by the same underlying indexical pro-form taan. It is
also unclear how to derive the 3rd person antecedence restriction of taan in both (1)
and (5) if taan is, indeed, underlyingly a 1st-person indexical.
3.1 Why do the semantic analyses fail?
The fact that Anand’s and Schlenker’s analyses come up against the same empirical
issues with regards to the Tamil data is not an accident. Below, I argue that these
problems can be traced back to three core issues. The first issue has to do with
assumptions regarding the relative syntactico-semantic status of indexicals and
anaphors/logophors. The second problem is that neither analysis presents a clear
model of the morphosyntactic issues associated with indexical shift. The third
problem has to with the fact that speech predicates are not syntactico-semantically
privileged relative to other intensional predicates with respect to their role in inducing
indexical shift.
4 Housecleaning issue I: indexicals vs. anaphors
As we’ve already seen, Schlenker treats all anaphors/logophors as indexicals that are
specified to obligatorily shift. Anand assumes that there is a fundamental difference
between indexicals and anaphors but, as discussed above, treats (Malayalam) taan
as a shifted indexical for independent reasons. The end result is that both Anand and
Schlenker end up treating taan as an obligatorily shifted indexical, rather than an
anaphor. It is this assumption, I propose, that is at the root of many of the problems
that these analyses face in accounting for the Tamil data.
If we assumed instead that taan is actually an anaphor rather than an indexical,
two core problems, namely the 3rd person antecedence restriction and the naan vs.
taan distinction, would disappear straightaway. Anaphors typically take 3rd person
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antecedents (Reinhart & Reuland 1993); thus, the 3rd person antecedence restriction
of taan, far from being anomalous, would be characteristic. The naan vs. taan
problem would also be obviated. Under the new taxonomy, naan would be the only
1st-person indexical pronoun in Tamil and it would be a rigid, Kaplanian indexical;
as an anaphor, taan simply wouldn’t compete for its place.
Crucially, claiming that taan is an anaphor in Tamil is not merely a strategic
ploy to account for the facts at hand. Strong empirical evidence both from thorough
crosslinguistic typological (Sells 1987) and syntactic (Huang & Liu 2001; Speas
& Tenny 2003; Bianchi 2003) studies shows that anaphors occur in a wider range
of syntactico-semantic environments than do shifted indexicals. According to Sells
(1987), anaphors may indicate the SOURCE of information, the internal SELF whose
mind is being reported or the physical PIVOT or viewpoint of an individual. As
such, anaphoric elements may occur under the scope of propositional attitude (BE-
LIEVE), factive (KNOW), epistemic (SEE), motion (COME) as well as propositional
speech predicates (SAY). In contrast, shifted indexical pronouns occur in much more
restricted environments: in languages where this phenomenon is morphophonologi-
cally distinguished, they have been shown to occur predominantly under the scope
of speech predicates. The distribution of Tamil taan thus fits in perfectly with that of
logophors crosslinguistically and less with that of indexicals, shifted or otherwise.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is a more familiar distinction between anaphors
and indexicals. This is the fact that the latter, but crucially not the former, may
occur as the subjects of matrix clauses (Baker 2008; Delfitto & Fiorin 2011): taan
resembles an anaphor in this respect as well, as it typically cannot occur as a matrix
subject.12
Based on such pervasive differences, I thus submit that taan should be treated
as an anaphor and not an indexical. Therefore, both the Schlenkerian idea that
all anaphors are obligatorily shifted indexicals and Anand’s argument that the De
Re Blocking effect is both a necessary and sufficient diagnostic to evaluate the
distinction between indexicals and anaphors should be subjected to further scrutiny.
5 Housecleaning issue II: Agree(ment) matters
If taan is an anaphor in both (1) and (5), which element is the indexical? The
obvious candidate would be the agreement marking on the embedded verb in (1)
since this alone alters its surface form under the scope of a speech predicate like
sonnaan (SAY.3MSG) in (1). However, as we’ve seen, agreement is not inherent to
the categorial head (T) on which it appears but is inherited from another element
in its local syntactic domain. In Tamil, agreement on T is typically triggered by
12 The well-known exception to this is the case of free indirect discourse where taan may occur as the
matrix subject. But this is a property that is common to logophors crosslinguistically (Sells 1987).
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a clausemate subject; thus, the obvious source for the monstrous agreement in (1)
would be the clausemate subject taan itself. Claiming that taan itself is an anaphor
and not an indexical, therefore, is equivalent to severing this direct connection
between taan and the agreement on its clausemate verb.
But why should agreement behave differently just in those cases where an
anaphoric subject is involved? There is a potential answer to this question: anaphors
crosslinguistically have been known to either not trigger agreement at all or trigger
special anaphoric agreement forms, a property that has been termed the Anaphor
Agreement Effect (AAE) (Rizzi 1990; Woolford 1999). Indeed, Woolford (1999)
proposes that the monstrous agreement in sentences like (1) represents a grammatical
conspiracy to avoid a violation of the AAE. This proposal, though interesting, is
not sufficient to explain the Tamil paradigms: specifically, it cannot explain why
the same apparent element taan should trigger monstrous agreement in (1) but a
different agreement in (5). Nevertheless, the idea that anaphors have a special
relationship with agreement has extensive crosslinguistic support and is thus worth
taking seriously. I will outline a preliminary analysis toward the end of this paper
that proposes that the syntactic feature content – or more specifically, the lack of the
relevant syntactic feature content – of taan prevents it from valuing the φ -features
(specifically the person feature) of an upward-probing clausemate T head, with the
result that this T gets its features valued higher up in the clausal left periphery.
6 Housecleaning issue III: attitude vs. speech predicates
The final issue is that there isn’t enough of a principled distinction made between
speech- and other attitude predicates. The logic behind this (often tacit) conflation
is a semantic one: attitude verbs like BELIEVE, as well as speech verbs like SAY,
have been observed to be capable of quantifying over worlds or over an enriched
intensional index involving worlds, times, and locations (Lewis 1980). Schlenker
(2003) proposes that these intensional indices are ontologically on a par with contex-
tual indices of the Kaplanian type, thus blurring the distinction between predicates
that introduce contextual features and those that introduce intensional ones. Thus,
analyses involving indexicality and indexical shift, which are thought to involve
these same contextual variables, treat speech- and attitude predicates on a par. Here,
I do not dispute the notion that speech predicates and attitude predicates are se-
mantically similar in both being able to introduce rich propositions. However, I
will argue, primarily from the typological and syntactic perspectives, that speech
predicates alone may introduce contextual variables in their scope and that there is a
relationship of structural containment (rather than identity) in the representation of
speech- and (other) attitude predicates in the syntax.
Strong empirical evidence from the syntactic and typological literature indicates
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that propositional speech predicates are underlyingly special. Cristofaro (2005)
points out that there is a strong implicational hierarchy in the size of complement
clauses that are selected by propositional predicates which corresponds to the lexico-
conceptual semantics of these verbs. Interestingly, this same hierarchy has been
independently argued to serve as an implicational hierarchy for logophoric predicates
(Culy 1994; Speas & Tenny 2003):
(11) COMPLEMENT SIZE AND LOGOPHORIC PREDICATE HIERARCHY:
Speech » Thought » Knowledge » Direct perception
Implication for logophors: If a language allows a logophor in the comple-
ment of one type of predicate, then it also allows a logophor in the comple-
ment of predicates higher in the hierarchy.
Implication for complement size: Speech complements are structurally the
largest; Direct perception complements are structurally the smallest.
Hooper & Thompson (1973), classifying predicates according to somewhat dif-
ferent criteria, demonstrate that certain root-transformations (such as VP-preposing
and topicalization) can apply to embedded clauses with a degree of ease that cor-
responds to the hierarchy above: thus, root-transformations apply most easily to
speech predicates, and least easily to direct perception predicates. Wiklund, Bentzen,
Hrafnbjargarson & Hróarsdóttir (2009) use the possibility of embedded V2 in Scan-
dinavian languages to confirm the ordering above. Finally, Cinque (1999) presents
data from the relative ordering and interpretive scope of adverbs and verbal affixes to
demonstrate that these also respect the same hierarchy. This type of evidence yields
the Cinque Hierarchy below:
(12) Cinque Hierarchy: Speech Act » Evaluative » Evidential » Epistemological.
Cinque’s hierarchy essentially rephrases Cristofaro’s predicate ranking into a hierar-
chy involving functional heads selected by the respective predicates. Thus, a speech
predicate selects a complement of the largest size (containing the Speech Act head
and all the ones below it) whereas an epistemological one selects the smallest one.
6.1 Relevance to indexical shift
How is all this relevant to the case of indexical shift? Recall that indexical shift is
predominantly induced under the scope of speech predicates. I reproduce an updated
version of the mini typological table for indexical shift from Anand (2006: 110).
It is immediately apparent from Table (1) that all these languages allow indexical
shift under propositional speech predicates. Slave, the lone language which also
permits indexical shift under WANT, nevertheless obeys the implicational hierarchy:
it also allows indexical shift under a predicate that is higher in the hierarchy, like
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LANGUAGE VERB CLASS DESCRIPTION
Amharic, Aghem SAY optionally shifts 1st/2nd person indexicals
Navajo SAY optionally shifts 1st/2nd person indexicals
Slave TELL optionally shifts 1st/2nd person indexicals
WANT optionally shifts 1st person indexicals
SAY obligatorily shifts 1st person indexicals
Zazaki SAY optionally shifts all 1st person indexicals
Tamil, Telugu SAY obligatorily shifts 1st-person verbal agreement
Donna SO (?) SAY obligatorily shifts 1st-person verbal agreement
English ALL no indexical shift
Table 1 Mini-typology of indexical shift across languages.
SAY and TELL. If we take seriously the idea that speech predicates are special and
different from attitude predicates and all other propositional predicates (and we
should) the fact that indexical shift is always effected under propositional speech
predicates would not be an accident.
Before moving on to an explication of my own analysis, I first briefly discuss
another prominent, and slightly more syntactic, analysis of indexical shift, namely
that of von Stechow (2002).
7 Feature-deletion and verbal-quantifier binding (von Stechow 2002)
von Stechow (2002) proposes that attitude predicates are “universal quantifiers which
take an egocentric proposition [a proposition that contains contextual variables
pertaining to the person, tense, and mood] as their complement”. Indexical shift, in
this model, obtains when an indexical pronoun is bound by such an attitude-verbal
quantifier.13 Von Stechow crucially claims that the features of a variable are deleted
at LF when they are bound: such feature-deletion is, in fact, a precondition on
variable binding. The difference between languages that manifest (person) indexical
shift, like Amharic or Tamil, and those that don’t, like English, is a function of
whether the features on the indexical may be deleted by the c-commanding verbal
quantifier or not (respectively).
For languages like English, von Stechow claims that feature-deletion obtains just
in case the features of the verbal quantifier match those of the indexical in value.
13 This is an extension of von Stechow’s analysis for bound-variable indexicals, – like “my” in the
sentence: “Only I finished drinking my beer”. This sentence, perhaps more patently, involves the
variable-binding of an indexical by a c-commanding quantifier, namely “only I”.
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This ensures that an attitude predicate that is marked 3rd person will never delete the
features of an (1st/2nd) indexical pronoun in its scope and will, by extension, never
bind it. As such, an indexical pronoun in English will never “shift” its reference to a
3rd person attitude-holder that c-commands it but will always refer deictically, as
desired. In languages that do evidence indexical shift, such as Amharic, the rules
governing feature-deletion are different. In such languages, the “verbal quantifiers
delete ([at] LF) the feature 1st of the person variable they bind, regardless of what
their person checkee is.” Thus, in a sentence like “John said3sg [CP that I am hungry]”
in Amharic, the features of the embedded indexical pronoun “I” could be deleted
and then bound by the 3SG features of the attitude predicate checkee. Crucially,
this feature deletion will happen at LF, so for the purposes of morphophonology,
the pronoun will still surface as “I”. The formal binding operations are reproduced
below (von Stechow 2002):14
(13) Target sentence: “John says I am a hero.” (Amharic)
a. John3rd says∗3rd λ<x1st . . . >. . . x1st am*1st a hero.
“John says ‘I am a hero.”’ (Shifted reading)
b. John3rd says∗3rd λ<x1st . . . >. . . y1st am∗1st a hero.
“John says ‘You are a hero.”’ (Unshifted reading)
What about logophors? Von Stechow claims that logophoric pronouns are
variables with Case- and φ -features and additionally proposes (though without much
independent argumentation) that they possess an inherent feature LOG (presumably
to differentiate them from 3rd person deictic pronouns). He tentatively also proposes
that they be assigned a feature -1ST to account for the fact that they do not occur in
the 1st person.
Von Stechow’s system does seem better equipped to handle the issues manifested
by the Tamil data in (1) and (5). For instance, deriving the distinction between naan
and taan is fairly unproblematic in von Stechow’s system: the former would be an
English-like, rigid indexical whereas the latter would be treated as a logophoric pro-
noun.15 In von Stechow’s model, this means that taan would have the features {3RD,
NOM, SG, LOG} whereas naan would be marked as {1ST, NOM, SG}. Crucially,
both would thus be treated as underlyingly different elements in the morphosyntax.
The featural properties of taan would also automatically account for the 3rd person
antecedence requirement on this element – a property that was genuinely difficult to
14 A quick note on the notation adopted here. For a privative feature F, [F] = the interpretable counterpart
of F; [*F] = the uninterpretable/inherited feature F.
15 taan fulfills von Stechow’s description of logophoric elements: it is a pronoun that is associated with
an obligatory de se interpretation, occurs in the scope of attitude predicates, and takes a 3rd person
antecedent. Thus, it seems reasonable to think that, all else being equal, taan would be treated as a
logophor in von Stechow’s system.
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account for in both Anand’s and Schlenker’s analyses where taan would have been
treated as an indexical, not a logophor.
7.1 Problematic: Monstrous vs. 3rd-person agreement in Tamil
The central problem that the von Stechow model faces is the difference between 3rd-
person and monstrous agreement patterns in (5) and (1), respectively. Von Stechow
distinguishes between interpretable and uninterpretable features and assumes a
standard Minimalist model of local feature-checking where agreement marking
on a T head in a subject-agreement language is straightforwardly inherited from a
clausemate subject. Recall that logophoric taan possesses the interpretable features
{3RD, LOG, NOM, SG} in both (1) and (5) in this analysis. As such, in both
structures, taan would transmit the features {3RD, LOG, NOM, SG} to its clausemate
T head in the Narrow Syntax. The latter would thus possess the uninterpretable
features: {*3RD, *LOG, *NOM, *SG} in the syntax – and these features would be
straightforwardly spelled out at PF. As such, the agreement marking on the embedded
verb in both (5) and (1) is expected to be the same – in blatant contradiction of
the actual facts.16 Thus, although unlike Schlenker and Anand, von Stechow does
provide a basic model of feature-structure and feature-checking, he doesn’t go far
enough. A related problem for von Stechow is that, in line with both Anand and
Schlenker, he doesn’t distinguish between the types of propositions introduced by
speech, attitude, and other types of predicates. As such, under his model, an attitude
predicate like that in (5) and the speech predicate in (1) are both expected to introduce
egocentric propositions of the same type. As such, the fact that monstrous agreement
obtains under a speech predicate in (1) and not under the intensional-predicate in (5)
must be reduced to mere accident.
8 The beginnings of an alternative model: cartography meets contextual fea-
tures
I take seriously the idea that speech predicates are underlyingly different from other
types of propositional predicates. Specifically, I assume that the complements of
speech predicates crosslinguistically are structurally larger than those selected by
other propositional predicates, in line with the Cinque hierarchy discussed above.
I will also assume, following proposals by Speas & Tenny (2003); Baker (2008)
and others that the Kaplanian contextual coordinates of <Speaker, Addressee, Time,
World, (Location)> are present in [Spec, CP] of all root clauses and some embedded
ones and play a crucial role in determining person, tense and mood features in the
16 Note that the feature-deletion rule covariable-binding should not affect this in any way since it is held
to only happen at LF.
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syntactic structure in their scope. Putting these assumptions together, I propose the
following generalization:
(14) CONTEXTUAL FEATURE GENERALIZATION (CFG):
a. For any language, only those clausal complements that contain a Speech-
Act Phrase are large enough to host their own contextual features in the
syntax.
b. These contextual features are hosted in the specifier of the Speech-Act
Phrase (defined in the sense of Cinque (1999).
I additionally put forth the following formal claims:
I. Informally, an anaphor is looking to represent the mental/physical
POV of some sentient individual (Sells 1987; Koopman & Sportiche
1989; Speas 2004). Formally, an anaphor is an element with an unval-
ued POV feature; this feature takes a reference index (or ID feature
(Hicks 2009, Adger and Ramchand 2005) of a sentient individual as
its value.
II. One of the specifiers in the clausal functional sequence hosts a
valued POV feature which is responsible for checking the unvalued
POV feature on an anaphor in its c-command domain. This specifier
is located crucially below the Speech-Act Phrase in the Cinque hier-
archy.17
III. Tamil taan is an anaphor, not an indexical. Given that that it
can be bound even under direct perception/evidential predicates, I
propose that the valued POV feature it agrees with is hosted in [Spec,
EvidP].
IV. Anaphors are incapable of triggering φ -agreement, presumably
because they are themselves φ -deficient: i.e., the Anaphor Agreement
Effect (AAE) holds in some form.
8.1 Deriving the monstrous agreement structure in (1)
Consider again the Tamil monstrous agreement structure in (1) repeated as (15)
below:
(15) Ramani
Raman[NOM.SG]
[CP taan{i,∗ j}
SE[NOM.SG]
jey-pp-een-nnu]
win-FUT-1SG-COMP
so-nn-aan.
say-PST-3MSG
“Ramani said [CP that he{i,∗ j} would win].”
17 For now, I follow Speas (2004) in assuming that a POV head may, in theory, be hosted within any
phrase in the functional sequence. The choice of phrase is parametrized and results in different
distributions for anaphors crosslinguistically, as reported by Culy (1994).
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This sentence can now be derived as follows. The SAY-class verb in (15) selects
a maximally large complement, i.e. Speech-ActP which hosts contextual features
pertaining to the matrix speech event. The φ -features of the matrix subject in (15)
are transmitted to the left periphery (via feature-transmission, in a manner to be
formalized). The 3MSG person feature of the matrix subject Raman is re-evaluated
under the new context: as Raman is the speaker of the matrix speech event, it is reset
as 1st-person. The embedded T head has unvalued φ -features but cannot get these
valued by its clausemate anaphoric subject taan (due to the AAE). As such, T keeps
probing upward until its person feature gets valued (as 1st-person) by the contextual
person feature in [Spec, SpeechAct-P]. The reference index Raman is separately
feature-transmitted to [Spec, EvidP]: this in turn checks the unvalued POV feature
of taan as [POV: Raman]. The result is that the embedded verb is valued as 1SG and
refers to the matrix speaker Raman; taan also refers to the matrix speaker Raman by
virtue of representing its mental point-of-view.
8.2 Deriving the 3rd-person agreement paradigm in (5)
Consider the structure in Tamil (5), repeated below:
(16) Seethai
Seetha[NOM.SG]
[CP taan{i,∗ j}
SE[NOM.SG]
jey-pp-aaí-nnu]
win-FUT-3FSG-COMP
nene-tt-aaí.
nene-PST-FSG
“Seethai thought [CP that she{i,∗ j} would win.]”
The crucial difference between (16) and (15) is the choice of matrix predicate in
each; this, in turn, brings about the difference in agreement paradigms. The matrix
verb in (16), being an evaluative predicate, selects an EvalP which is structurally
smaller than a SpeechAct-P. By (14) above, contextual features may only be hosted
on [Spec, SpeechAct-P]; as such, the embedded EvalP in (16) is not anchored to a
new speech context.
The 3FSG φ -features of the matrix subject in (16) are featurally transmitted to
the highest projection in the left periphery, just like with (15). However, in this case,
the leftmost position is [Spec, EvalP]. Thus, the person features of the matrix subject
Seetha are not context-shifted or “reset” (as with (15)) but are straightforwardly
evaluated against the context of utterance, as 3FSG. The embedded Agr probes
upward, again cannot get its φ -features valued by the anaphoric taan (due to the
AAE), and keeps probing until it reaches EvalP in the left periphery. The inherited
φ -features on [Spec, EvalP] value the embedded Agr with the φ -features of the
matrix subject, namely as 3FSG. Meanwhile, the reference ID of the matrix subject
Seetha is feature-transmitted to [Spec, EvidP] and values taan as [POV: Seetha].
The relevant agreement and binding paradigms are thus accounted for.
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